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JURISDICTION 
Jurisdiction is vested in this Court pursuant to Const, of Utah Art. VIII 
Sec. 3, and Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(3). This Court accepted jurisdiction on 
an interlocutory appeal on November 28, 2001 pursuant to Utah R.App.P. 
Rule 5(c). 
Plaintiffs have concurred with the Court's jurisdiction. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED 
Was Defendant Ross within the course and scope of her employment, 
thereby rendering the City vicariously liable, when she was involved in an 
automobile accident with Plaintiffs: 
1) while in Tooele County, outside of Salt Lake City's municipal 
boundaries; 
2) while she was off duty; 
3) while performing no police function; 
4) while driving to her home, with her one year old child; 
5) in a City police car that she, in her sole discretion, chose to drive? 
This issue was preserved in the trial court by Plaintiffs' Motion for 
Partial Summary Judgment and the City's Motion for Summary Judgment. 
See Record 59-60 and 69-70. The preservation of such issue is 
demonstrated by the trial court's Memorandum Decision dated September 
17, 2001, see Record 142-148 and the trial court's Order dated October 2, 
2001, entering Partial Summary Judgment to Plaintiffs and denying the 
City's Motion for Summary Judgment, see Record 149-151. 
RELEVANT STATUTES AND ORDINANCES 
The following statutes have relevance to the City's argument and are 
reprinted in toto, in Addendum 3, attached hereto: 10-3-914, 53-13-103 and 
77-9-3. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
While returning home after attending a meeting at her work, Ms. 
Ross, a Salt Lake City police officer, was involved in an accident with the 
Plaintiffs in Tooele County. At the time of the accident, Ms. Ross had 
chosen to drive a Salt Lake City police vehicle and was also transporting her 
one-year old son. The Plaintiffs' claim that Salt Lake City is vicariously 
liable for Ms. Ross's conduct. 
Salt Lake City contends that Ms. Ross was not within the scope of her 
employment and cannot meet the test set forth in Birkner v. Salt Lake 
County, 111 P.2d 1053 (Utah 1989). The trial court made no effort to apply 
this test. 
In addition, the parties agree that the general rule is that an employee 
is not acting within the course and scope of her employment when the 
2 
employee is going to or from home to work (the "coming and going" rule). 
Whitehead v. Variable Annuity Life Insurance Co., 801 P.2d 934, 936 (Utah 
1989). However, Plaintiffs argue that there are two exceptions to that rule: 
1) the "special errand" exception; and 2) the "employer provided 
transportation" exception. The trial court found that the second of these 
applied, concluded that Ms. Ross was within the course and scope of her 
employment and granted Plaintiffs' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment 
on the issue of vicarious liability and denied the City's Motion for Summary 
Judgment. The trial court did not rule on the "special errand" exception. 
The trial court held that a police officer "is essentially always on duty, at 
least when operating a police vehicle." Salt Lake City contends that the trial 
court applied the wrong test, ignored the clear case law to the contrary and 
reached the wrong conclusion. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
1. Defendant Michelle Ross is employed as a Salt Lake City 
police officer. Deposition of Michelle Ross, R. 63. 
2. Ms. Ross lives in Tooele, Utah. Deposition of Michelle Ross, 
R. 63. 
3. Ms. Ross requested to be assigned as a Field Training Officer 
("FTO"). Deposition of Michelle Ross, R. 125. 
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4. On the day of the accident giving rise to this lawsuit, Ms. Ross 
was returning to Tooele in her police car after attending a FTO meeting in 
Salt Lake City on a day she otherwise would not have worked. Deposition 
of Michelle Ross, R. 63. 
5. The FTO meetings were regularly scheduled every three weeks. 
Deposition of Michelle Ross, R. 72. 
6. Ms. Ross is paid for three hours to attend the FTO meetings 
even if the meeting goes less than three hours. Deposition of Michelle Ross, 
R. 63. 
7. If the FTO meeting went longer than three hours, Ms. Ross 
would be paid for the actual length of the meeting. Deposition of Michelle 
Ross, R. 72. 
8. The calculation of the time would be made from the start of the 
meeting to the end of the meeting. Deposition of Michelle Ross, R. 72. 
9. Ms. Ross commutes to and from work in a Salt Lake City 
owned police car pursuant to the City's "take home car program." 
Deposition of Michelle Ross, R. 63. 
10. Ms. Ross's use of the vehicle is limited by regulation to 
traveling to and from work and other "official business." Deposition of 
Michelle Ross, R. 63. 
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11. It is Ms. Ross's choice to participate in the take-home car 
program. Deposition of Michelle Ross, R. 125. 
12. Salt Lake City does not require Ms. Ross to use a City vehicle 
to drive to and from work. Deposition of Michelle Ross, R. 73. 
13. Ms. Ross could use her personal vehicle to go to and from work 
if she chose. Deposition of Michelle Ross, R. 73. 
14. The choice to use a City vehicle is totally Ms. Ross's. 
Deposition of Michelle Ross, R. 73. 
15. Ms. Ross pays for the use of the City vehicle. Deposition of 
Michelle Ross, R. 73. 
16. Ms. Ross is not compensated for her travel to and from work. 
Deposition of Michelle Ross, R. 72. 
17. Ms. Ross is not provided mileage for her travel to and from 
work. Deposition of Michelle Ross, R. 72. 
18. Ms. Ross had her 1-year old son in the car with her at the time 
of the accident. Deposition of Michelle Ross, R. 72. 
19. Ms. Ross had her son in the police vehicle approximately 50 
times when going to or from police sponsored events. Deposition of 
Michelle Ross, R 73. 
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20. If Ms. Ross saw an emergency or dangerous situation while in 
Tooele County and had a civilian passenger in her vehicle, under Salt Lake 
City policy she is required to take that individual to a secure place away 
from her vehicle before she could respond. Deposition of Michelle Ross, 
R. 73. 
21. While driving the police vehicle, Ms. Ross was required to have 
her police radio on throughout the drive to and from Tooele and to be 
available and respond to emergency calls. Deposition of Michelle Ross, 
R.63. 
22. Although Ms. Ross leaves her police radio on while in Tooele 
County, there are dead spots along the way and she does not know if 
dispatch can hear her. Deposition of Michelle Ross, R. 74. 
23. Ms. Ross was not in uniform at the time of the accident. 
Deposition of Michelle Ross, R. 73. 
24. Ms. Ross has never been called out to respond from Tooele 
County. Deposition of Michelle Ross, R. 73. 
25. Ms. Ross has never responded to an emergency in Tooele 
County. Deposition of Michelle Ross, R. 74. 
26. Ms. Ross does not know how to contact Tooele County 
emergency dispatch. Deposition of Michelle Ross, R. 74. 
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27. Ms. Ross was not pursuing any police business at the time of 
the accident and was driving home from the FTO meeting. Deposition of 
Michelle Ross, R. 71. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
I. 
THE TRIAL COURT FAILED TO APPLY 
THE BIRKNER TEST 
In Birkner v. Salt Lake County, 111 P.2d 1053 (1989) the Supreme 
Court established the test for "scope of employment cases: 1) the 
employee's conduct must be of a general kind the employee is employed to 
perform; 2) the employee's conduct must occur within the hours of the 
employee's work and the ordinary spatial boundaries of the employment; 
and 3) the employee's conduct must be motivated, at least in part, by the 
purpose of serving her employer's interest. 
Ms. Ross, who was simply driving home after work with her infant 
son, had an accident in Tooele County. Her conduct does not meet the 
Birkner test. 
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II. 
THE "COMING AND GOING" RULE 
APPLIES TO MS. ROSS'S COMMUTE 
TO HER HOME IN TOOELE COUNTY 
As a general rule, an employee is not acting within the course and 
scope of her employment when she is going to or from work. Ms. Ross's 
commute fits squarely within this rule and Salt Lake City should not be held 
vicariously liable for her conduct. 
In addition, Ms. Ross does not fit within either the "owner-required 
transportation" or "special errand" exceptions to the "coming and going" 
rule. Ms. Ross was simply driving home in a vehicle she chose to drive; she 
paid the City for the privilege of driving it; she was transporting her infant 
child - consequently was unavailable for duty; and the accident took place 
outside the boundaries of Salt Lake City. 
III. 
THE TRIAL COURT APPLIED THE 
INCORRECT TEST 
The trial court wholly ignored the Birkner test and the "coming and 
going" rule, focusing instead solely upon the "owner-required 
transportation" exception that it mischaracterized as the "owner-provided 
transportation" exception. 
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The trial court ignored all relevant Utah case law, instead adopting a 
New Mexico case that relied upon facts and law in diametric contradiction to 
the facts of this case and the law of the State of Utah. 
The trial court performed almost no evaluation of the underlying facts 
nor the respective benefits of the City and Ms. Ross. 
The trial court's result is contrary to the clear and consistent rulings of 
the appellate courts of this State. 
ARGUMENT 
The trial court, after considering the uncontested facts in this matter, 
and the arguments of counsel, concluded that a police officer "is essentially 
always on duty, at least when operating a police vehicle." (Memorandum 
Decision, p. 5 attached hereto as Addendum l.1) Based thereon, the trial 
court imposed respondeat superior liability upon Salt Lake City. To support 
its ruling the trial court fashioned this all-encompassing rule of law in spite 
of this Court's consistent holding that "[s]cope of employment issues are in 
general highly fact-dependent. Indeed, our prior case law recognizes that 
'whether or not the injury arises out of or within the scope of employment 
depends upon the particular facts of each case.'" Drake v. Industrial 
1
 On the 2 day of October, 2001 the trial court entered its Order granting 
Plaintiffs Motion for Partial Summary Judgment and denying the City's 
Motion for Summary Judgment consistent with the Memorandum Decision. 
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Commission of Utah, 939 P.2d 177, 182 (Utah 1977) citing State Tax 
Commission v. Industrial Commission of Utah, 685 P.2d 1051, 1053 (Utah 
1984). 
Indeed, this Court has been reluctant "to formulate and impose a fact-
specific rule of law because of the likelihood that no rule can be formulated 
that will adequately address all potential facts in these cases." Drake, 939 
P.2d at 182. Nonetheless, the trial court did precisely what this Court has 
declined to do. In addition, rather than applying the proper tests for scope 
of employment previously promulgated by this Court, the trial court 
fashioned its own hybrid test and did not take into account the specific facts 
of this matter. 
This Court has fashioned two distinct "scope of employment" tests: 1) 
the Birkner test ; and 2) the "coming and going" test. In arriving at its 
decision, the trial court acknowledged these tests, made no effort to apply 
Birkner, misapplied the "coming and going" test and ended up with a rule of 
law that defies the reasoning behind either of the recognized tests. The City 
is unaware of any guiding case that has attempted to reconcile these two 
tests but, under either, the trial court's conclusion was erroneous. 
2Birkner v. Salt Lake County, 111 P.2d 1053, 1056-57 (Utah 1989). 
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I. 
THE TRIAL COURT FAILED TO 
APPLY THE BIRKNER TEST 
The result reached by the trial court reflects a disregard for the scope 
of employment test set forth in Birkner v. Salt Lake County, 111 P.2d 1053, 
1056-1057 (Utah 1989).3 Therein, this Court detailed the criteria requisite to 
a finding of scope of employment: (1) an employee's conduct must be of a 
general kind the employee is employed to perform; (2) the employee's 
conduct must occur within the hours of the employee's work and the 
ordinary spatial boundaries of the employment; and (3) the employee's 
conduct must be motivated, at least in part, by the purpose of serving her 
employer's interest.4 
This Court has repeatedly expressed its support for the Birkner test. See 
Clark v. Pangan, 2000 UT 37125, 998 P.2d 268; Crissman v. Hallows, 
2000 UT App. 104123, 999 P.2d 1249, 1251; Wilson v. Valley Mental 
Health, 969 P.2d 416, 420 (Utah 1998); Jensen v. IHC Hospitals, 944 P.2d 
327, n. 1 (Utah 1997); Glover v. Boy Scouts of America, 923 P.2d 1383, 
1385 (Utah 1996); Kunz v. Beneficial Temporaries, 921 P.2d 456, n. 9 (Utah 
1996); Jackson v. Righter, 891 P.2d 1387, 1391 (Utah 1995); Christensen v. 
Swenson, 874 P.2d 125, 127 (Utah 1994); S.H v. State of Utah, 865 P.2d 
1363, 1366 (Utah 1993); J.H v. West Valley City 840 P.2d 115, fn 25 (Utah 
1992); Mounteer v. Utah Power & Light, 823 P.2d 1055, 1058 (Utah 1991); 
Hodges v. Gibson Products, 811 P.2d 151, 156 (Utah 1991); and Clover v. 
Snowbird Ski Resort, 808 P.2d 1037, 1040 (Utah 1991). 
4
 In applying the Birkner test, the Court of Appeals further indicated that "an 
employee who fails to meet any one of these three factors is outside the 
scope of employment and the employer cannot be held liable under the 
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Applying this test to the specific facts in this matter results in 
conclusion contrary to that reached by the trial court. 
A. 
MS. ROSS WAS NOT PERFORMING ANY 
WORK FOR WHICH SHE WAS HIRED. 
Under the first prong of the Birkner test, an employee's conduct must 
be of a general kind the employee is employed to perform. Birkner, 111 
P.2d at 1056-57. "In other words, the employee must be about the 
employer's business and the duties assigned by the employer." Birkner, 111 
P.2d at 1057. A review of the facts herein results in a clear conclusion that 
Ms. Ross was not within the parameters of that prong. 
At the time of the accident, Ms. Ross was doing nothing more than 
driving home from a work-related meeting. {See Fact No. 4.) Although she 
was paid for her time at the meeting {see Fact No. 6), she was not paid for 
her time traveling to and from work {see Fact No. 16) nor was she provided 
mileage for her travel to and from work {see Fact No. 17). 
At the time of the accident, Ms. Ross was transporting her 1-year old 
son {see Fact No. 18) and was incapable of immediately responding to an 
emergency or dangerous situation. {See Fact No. 20.) 
doctrine ofrespondeat superior"" Christensen v. Burns, 844 P.2d 992, 994 
(Utah App. 1992) reversed on other grounds Christensen v. Swenson, 874 
P.2d 125 (Utah 1994). 
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The City does not require Ms. Ross to use the City police vehicle for 
her commute. (See Fact No. 12.) It was Ms. Ross's choice to use the City 
vehicle (see Fact Nos. 11 and 14) and she could have used her personal 
vehicle if she chose. (See Fact No. 13.) Ms. Ross pays the City for the right 
to use the City vehicle. (See Fact No. 15.) There can be no doubt that Ms. 
Ross was employed to perform police work within Salt Lake City not to 
commute to and from Tooele County with her infant child. 
Applying these facts to the first prong of the Birkner test makes 
certain conclusions self-evident, i.e., Ms. Ross was not employed nor 
compensated to drive a vehicle, City-owned or personal, to and from work; 
she was not paid to be in Tooele County; she was not paid to be transporting 
her child. She was not, in her own words, pursuing any police business. 
(See Fact No. 27). 
The trial court's Memorandum Decision is devoid of any assessment 
of this prong and such failure was fatal to its conclusion. The proper 
application of the uncontroverted facts to this prong clearly leads to the 
inescapable conclusion that Ms. Ross's conduct was not related to the type 
of work she was employed to perform. Just as clearly, Ms. Ross was not 
assigned any duties by Salt Lake City and was not performing any duties on 
behalf of Salt Lake City at the time and place of the accident. 
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B. 
MS. ROSS'S CONDUCT WAS NOT WITHIN 
THE HOURS OF HER EMPLOYMENT NOR 
WITHIN THE SPATIAL BOUNDARIES 
OF HER EMPLOYMENT 
In order to satisfy the second prong of Birkner, Ms. Ross's conduct 
must have occurred during the hours of her employment. Birkner, 111 P.2d 
at 1057. It is uncontested that she was not on the City's payroll at the time of 
the accident and was not compensated for her commute time. {See Facts 
Nos. 4 and 16.) There simply is not a scintilla of evidence that sustains a 
conclusion that Ms. Ross was within the hours of her employment. 
Similarly, the facts do not support a conclusion that she was within 
the ordinary spatial boundaries of her employment as required by Birkner. 
Birkner, 111 P.2d at 1057. At the time of the accident, Ms. Ross was not 
within the municipal limits of Salt Lake City or even Salt Lake County - but 
was within the boundaries of Tooele County. The trial court did not take 
such facts into account and when these facts are taken into account, no 
reasonable person could conclude that Ms. Ross was within the spatial 
confines of her employment. 
There may be those who suggest that a police officer has statewide 
law enforcement capability and accordingly, territorial boundaries are 
irrelevant. The statutory law of this state, however, leads to a much more 
14 
restrictive conclusion. For instance, a Salt Lake City police officer has law 
enforcement authority "[wjithin the boundaries of the municipality." Utah 
Code Ann. § 10-3-914(1). 
While a police officer may have statewide authority under certain 
circumstances, such circumstances do not apply to his instant matter. The 
Uniform Act on Fresh Pursuit, Utah Code Ann. § 53-13-103(3)(a), provides: 
(3)(a) A law enforcement officer has statewide 
full-spectrum peace officer authority, but the 
authority extends to other counties, cities, or towns 
only when the officer is acting under Title 77, 
Chapter 9, Uniform Act on Fresh Pursuit, unless 
the law enforcement officer is employed by the 
state. 
(Emphasis added.) 
Correspondingly, Utah Code Ann. § 77-9-3 provides that an officer 
may only act beyond his "normal jurisdiction" (a) when in fresh pursuit; (b) 
when a public offense is committed in the officers presence; (c) when 
participating in an investigation that originated in the officer's normal 
jurisdiction in cooperation with the local authority; or (d) when called to 
assist a local officer.5 
5
 In addition, if possible, an officer should notify and receive approval from 
the local law enforcement agency before taking action. Ms. Ross testified 
that she did not know how to contact the local law enforcement agency. (See 
Fact No. 26.) 
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Ms. Ross was clearly not acting pursuant to the Uniform Act because 
she was not performing any of the four required police functions. In fact, 
she was not pursuing any police business at the time of the accident. (See 
Fact No. 27.) Nor was she in any "standby" position. As previously noted, 
Ms. Ross had her 1-year old son in the car and could not respond to a 
dangerous or emergency condition. (See Fact No. 20.) Ms. Ross did not 
know if there could be communications with Salt Lake City Police 
Department dispatch because there were "dead spots" that made her police 
radio not work. (See Fact No. 22.)6 Accordingly, Ms. Ross was not 
performing any employment services within the spatial boundaries of Salt 
Lake City, she was not available to perform them and she was not 
performing any duties under the auspices of the Uniform Act on Fresh 
Pursuit. Ms. Ross was driving home from work - nothing more. 
C. 
MS. ROSS'S CONDUCT WAS NOT MOTIVATED 
BY SALT LAKE CITY'S INTERESTS 
The final prong of Birkner directs that Ms. Ross's conduct must be 
motivated by the purpose of serving Salt Lake City's interests. Ms. Ross 
admits that she was performing no police function at the time of the 
6
 In fact, Ms. Ross has never been called out by the Salt Lake City Police 
Department to return to duty from Tooele County and has never responded 
to an emergency in Tooele County. (See Fact Nos. 24 and 25.) 
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accident. {See Fact No. 27.) Her sole and singular conduct was driving 
home, with her son, to Tooele County. The City's interests were not, in any 
regard, advanced by this conduct. 
In Whiteheadv. Variable Annuity Life Insurance Co., 801 P.2d 934, 
937 (Utah 1989), this Court found that the employer "had no control over 
[the employee's] decision to commute to and from work, the route he chose, 
or the manner in which he drove his automobile." The Court ruled that the 
employee was outside of his scope of employment. Similarly, Salt Lake 
City had no control over Ms. Ross's commute. The facts are that Ms. Ross 
chose to drive a City vehicle; Ms. Ross chose the route she drove; and Ms. 
Ross controlled her driving, all without any input or control from the City. 
In addition, the Whitehead Court found that a "useful test [regarding 
the scope of employment] is whether the trip is one which would have 
required the employer to send another employee over the same route or to 
perform the same function if the trip had not been made." Whitehead, 801 
P.2d at 937. Clearly, Salt Lake City had no interest in having a Salt Lake 
City police officer in Tooele County at the time and location of the accident 
and certainly would not have sent another police officer to Tooele County in 
Ms. Ross's place. 
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Just as clearly, Ms. Ross meets none of the Birkner test's prongs let 
alone all of them. Ms. Ross was not in the course and scope of her 
employment at the time of the accident. The trial court's conclusion, 
reached without applying the Birkner test to the specific facts in this matter, 
was reversible error. 
II. 
THE "COMING AND GOING" RULE APPLIES 
TO MS. ROSS'S COMMUTE TO HER HOME 
IN TOOELE COUNTY 
The parties are in agreement that it is the general rule that an 
employee is not acting within the course and scope of her employment when 
she is going to or coming from work.7 Whitehead, 801 P.2d at 935. It is 
equally uncontested that Ms. Ross was on her way home from work. {See 
Fact No. 4.) 
The "coming and going" rule "arose because, 'in most instances, such 
an injury is suffered as a consequence of risks and hazards to which all 
members of the traveling public are subject rather than risks and hazards 
having to do with and originating in the work or business of the employer.'" 
Although this Court has not had occasion to reconcile the elements of the 
Birkner test with those of the "coming and going" rule, the City respectfully 
submits that, in a negligence context, they are functionally equivalent - that 
is, the "coming and going" rule is simply another way of defining the third 
prong of the Birkner test.. However, even if they are distinct, Plaintiffs 
cannot prevail under either. 
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Drake v. Industrial Commission, 939 P.2d 177, 182 (Utah 1997). This very 
principle is fully applicable to the case of Ms. Ross. She was simply a 
member of the traveling public who, by her own choice, happened to be in a 
police vehicle outside of her law enforcement jurisdiction. 
Recognizing that there may be occasions when travel is employment-
related, the Court has recognized the inapplicability of the "coming and 
going" rule when the travel is in connection with "an act outside an 
employee's regular duties which is undertaken in good faith to advance the 
employer's interests." Drake, 939 P.2d at 183 citing State Tax Commission 
685 P.2d at 1051. There are no facts to support a finding that Ms. Ross, in 
good faith or otherwise, undertook to do anything to advance Salt Lake 
City's interest while commuting in Tooele County. The interests being 
advanced were simply the same as all members of the commuting public - to 
get from one location to another. 
This Court has succinctly defined the "coming and going" rule as: 
[W]hen the employee engages in a special activity which is 
within the course of employment, and which is reasonably at 
the request or invitation of the employer, any injury suffered 
while traveling to and from the place of such activity is also 
within the course and scope of employment. 
Z>dte, 939P.2dl83. 
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Ms. Ross was not involved in any "special activity" let alone at the 
request of Salt Lake City. She was engaged in the daily and mundane act of 
returning home from work. 
Similarly, "[t]he major premise of the 'going and coming' rule is that 
it is unfair to impose unlimited liability on an employer for conduct of its 
employees over which it has no control and from which it derives no 
benefit." Whitehead, 801 P.2d at 937; Salt Lake City had no control over 
Ms. Ross's decision regarding her choice of vehicles, her route or her 
driving and derived no benefit from her presence at the time and place of the 
accident.8 
This Court has been clear that when applying the "coming and going" 
rule to negligence cases, "it is fundamental that even though the employee 
may not be at a regular place of work, he must be performing a duty for his 
employer, or one which is so connected with his employment as to be an 
essential part thereof " Lundberg, 465 P.2d at 176 (emphasis added). It is 
apparent that the "coming and going" rule is applicable to Ms. Ross's 
"Mere arrival at work is not considered a substantial benefit to the 
employer." VanLeeuwen v. Industrial Commission, 901 P.2d 281, 285 (Utah 
App. 1995) citing Lundberg v. Cream O Weber, 465 P.2d 175, 176 (Utah 
1970). It was Ms. Ross's decision to live in Tooele County and when "it is 
the employee's individual choice to secure remote employment, [] it does 
not follow that such a decision inherently confers a benefit on one's 
employer." Cross v. Industrial Commission, 824 P.2d 1202, 1206 (Utah 
App. 1992). 
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commute and Salt Lake City is not responsible for her conduct pursuant to 
respondeat superior. 
In recognition of the tenuousness of their position under their 
argument, Plaintiffs attempt to avoid the results of the "coming and going" 
rule by submitting that two separate and distinct exceptions apply: 1) the 
"owner-provided transportation" exception and 2) the "special errand" 
exception. However, applying the facts of this case to the requirements of 
those exceptions, demonstrates a clear inability of Plaintiffs to successfully 
place Ms. Ross within either exception. 
A. 
THE "OWNER-PROVIDED TRANSPORTATION" 
EXCEPTION DOES NOT APPLY TO 
MS. ROSS'S COMMUTE 
The trial court apparently reached its erroneous conclusion after 
relying upon the "owner provided transportation" exception to the "coming 
and going" rule.9 In arguing their position, Plaintiffs mischaracterized the 
"owner-required transportation" test as the "owner-provided transportation" 
test. Unfortunately, the trial court ignored this important distinction as well 
9
 Such exception is founded in workers' compensation cases and, to date, is 
unrecognized in third party negligence cases. 
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as case law to the contrary. By adopting Plaintiffs' mischaracterization, the 
trial court committed error. 
The trial court initiated its analysis by incorrectly relying upon a quote 
from State Tax Commission v. Industrial Commission, 685 P.2d 1051, 1053 
(Utah 1984),10 to wit: "the going and coming rule does not apply 'where 
transportation was furnished by the employer . . .'" (See Memorandum 
Decision p. 4.) Such quote was made* with reference to a previous case -
Kinne v. Industrial Commission 609 P.2d 926 (Utah 1980). A review of the 
facts of Kinne demonstrates that the trial court's reliance on the "employer 
furnished" transportation was misplaced. In Kinne, a workers' 
compensation case, the claimant took his employer's vehicle home because 
"it was understood that maintenance work [on the vehicle] was [claimant's] 
responsibility... [and claimant had taken the vehicle] home and had 
performed certain required repairs on it for the benefit of [the employer]." 
Kinne 609 P.2d at 927 (emphasis added).11 
The Court erroneously attributed the quote to Whitehead v. Variable 
Annuity Life Insurance, 801 P.2d 934 (Utah 1989). 
11
 In addition, the trial court misread State Tax Commission. It is not an 
"owner-provided transportation" case but, rather, a "special errand" case. 
See Cross v. Board of Review of the Industrial Commission, 824 P.2d 1202, 
1205 (Utah App. 1992). 
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Consistent with those facts, the Court in State Tax Commission also 
referred to Bailey v. Industrial Commission 398 P.2d 545 (Utah 1965) for 
the proposition that scope of employment may be found "where the 
employer requires the employee to use a vehicle as an instrumentality of the 
business." State Tax Commission, 685 P.2d at 1053 (emphasis added.) 
It is noteworthy that all three cases, Kinne, Bailey and State Tax 
Commission were workers' compensation cases where the claimants' burden 
were the beneficiaries of a presumption in their favor as opposed to a 
negligence claim, such as the instant matter, where Plaintiffs have to 
establish their claim by a preponderance of the evidence. The trial court 
not only failed to take such evidentiary burden-shifting into account but 
failed to acknowledge the differing burdens. 
Workers' Compensation cases are of little value for stare decisis purposes 
inasmuch as the Workers' Compensation Act is liberally construed and 
applied to provide coverage. Any doubt respecting the right of 
compensation will be resolved in favor of the claimant. State Tax 
Commission, 685 P.2d at 1053. In the instant matter, no such presumption 
favors Plaintiffs who still bear the burden of proving the essential elements 
by a preponderance of the evidence. Dalley v. Utah Valley Regional 
Medical Center, 791 P.2d 193, 200 (Utah 1990). See also, Model Utah Jury 
Instructions - Civil 2.18. As such, Workers' Compensation cases are 
germane only as somewhat instructive; provided, if a claimant could not 
prevail under the more liberal standards of Workers' Compensation cases, it 
is unlikely that Plaintiffs could prevail under the more restrictive standards 
of negligence law. 
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A review of the workers' compensation cases dealing with this limited 
exception, to the extent they are relevant to negligence cases at all, 
demonstrates the error of the trial court's conclusion. 
Plaintiffs, below, also relied on Bailey v. Industrial Commission, 398 
P.2d 545 (Utah 1965) but such reliance was misplaced. In reaching its 
conclusion that claimant was entitled to workers' compensation coverage, 
the Court, in that case, found that "when an employee is required by his 
employer to bring his own vehicle to the place of business for use there, the 
employee is covered while going to and from work." Bailey, 398 P.2d at 
546. (Emphasis added.) 
In its analysis, the Court cited and adopted Davis v. Bjorenson, 293 
N.W. 829 (Iowa 1940) as controlling. The Court specifically relied upon the 
following: 
[I]t was [claimant's] duty and this duty was regular 
and definite, to take the automobile to the 
employer's shop for its use in the business, by 
others as well as claimant. . . claimant had no 
selection of his mode of travel to work, he was 
required under the terms of his contract to drive 
his own car from his home to the shop . . . 
(Emphasis added.) 
13
 Trying to reconcile the facts in Bailey and their application to workers' 
compensation coverage, the Court conceded that "the question is a close 
one." Bailey, 398 P.2d at 546. 
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The facts in the instant matter are considerably at odds with those 
relied upon in Bailey. The testimony of Ms. Ross is most compelling 
against Plaintiffs' position. Admittedly, Ms. Ross was not pursuing any 
police business at the time of the accident. See Fact No. 27. Salt Lake City 
did not require Ms. Ross to use a City vehicle. See Fact No. 12. Ms. Ross 
could have used her own personal vehicle for her travels. See Fact Nos. 11 
and 13. The decision to use a City vehicle is totally Ms. Ross's. See Fact 
No. 14. Ms. Ross pays the City to use its vehicle. See Fact No. 15. Ms. 
Ross was not compensated for her travel time. See Fact No. 16. Ms. Ross is 
not reimbursed for mileage. See Fact No. 17. 
Likewise, in State Tax Commission, 685 P.2d at 1053, the Court also 
referred to the "requires the employee to use a vehicle" standard prior to 
finding a course and scope of employment. See also, Windsor Insurance v. 
American States Insurance, 2001 UT App. 98 f 13, 418 Utah Adv. Rep. 13. 
("[The employer] did not require [driver] to take her vehicle.") (Emphasis 
added.) See also, Whitehead, 801 P.2d at 936-37 ("it was the regular and 
definite duty to take the automobile"). (Emphasis added.) See also, 
VanLeewen, 901 P.2d at 285 ("[Employer] did not require [Employee] to 
perform any job-related service or use the vehicle as a business 
instrumentality while traveling to and from work") (Emphasis added). 
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In further support of their argument, Plaintiffs also submitted for the 
trial court's consideration, cases from Nevada and New York. However, 
even Plaintiffs' Nevada case Tighe v. Las Vegas Metro Police Dep % 877 
P.2d 1032, 1035 (Nev. 1994) recognizes: "Today's ruling is not sufficiently 
broad and all-inclusive to justify the conclusion that all law enforcement 
officers are always excluded from [the coming and going] rule . . ." 
(Emphasis in original.) Plaintiffs argued in favor of just such a "broad and 
all-inclusive" result and the trial court acceded to that argument. 
Plaintiffs' foreign cases, however, do not aid their position. The 
broad language relied upon by Plaintiffs in their New York case, Collier v. 
County of Nassau, 362 N.Y.S.2d 52 (Supreme Court Appellate Division 
1974) was significantly curtailed in DeJesus v. New York State Police, 467 
N.Y.S.2d 916, 917 (Supreme Court Appellate Division 1983) when the 
Court, after reviewing Collier, held: "[Claimant had completed his tour of 
duty, changed from his uniform to civilian dress, checked out of the police 
barracks and operated his private automobile outside the geographical area 
of his assigned employment before the happening of the accident." 
(Emphasis added). Inasmuch as Ms. Ross was off-duty, out of uniform and 
out of her geographical jurisdiction, DeJesus is much more factually similar 
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to the current matter than is Collier and, in DeJesus, the Court refused to 
find scope and course of employment.14 
Further, Plaintiffs' citations from other states do not represent a 
consistent position throughout the states. For instance, in Koscelek v. Lucas, 
43 A.2d 550, 551-52 (Pa. 1945), the Pennsylvania Court reviewed a 
negligence claim against Allegheny County. In that case, a county police 
officer was off-duty and driving home. During his drive, he observed what 
appeared to be an automobile accident. He stopped his car to investigate, 
backed up and hit and injured the plaintiff. 
The injured plaintiff contended, as do Plaintiffs here, that a police 
officer is on duty twenty-four hours a day and that he had the right and duty 
to investigate a supposed accident and render assistance, even when not on 
duty. For purposes of their decision, the Court assumed that contention to be 
true.15 Even with that assumption, the Court declined to hold the County 
liable under respondeat superior, stating: 
To hold a master legally responsible for the act of 
a servant who is engaged in furthering his master's 
In Collier, it should also be noted that the police vehicle was used as a car 
pool vehicle for four officers at the time of the accident. Collier, 362 
N.Y.S.2d at 52. 
15
 The Court assumed this contention for purposes of argument but 
specifically declined to adopt it as a statement of the law. Koscelek, 43 A.2d 
at 551. 
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business and who, while doing so, negligently uses 
some instrumentality that carries him from place to 
place, it must either be proved that the master 
exercised actual or potential control over that 
instrumentality, or the use of the instrumentality at 
the time and place of the act complained of must 
be of such vital importance in furthering the 
business of the master that the latter's actual or 
potential control of it at that time and place may be 
reasonably inferred. 
Koscelek, 43 A.2d at 551. 
Salt Lake City had no more control over Ms. Ross than Allegheny 
County did over their officer. In fact in Koscelek, the off-duty officer was 
actually attempting to render police services. Ms. Ross was simply driving 
home with her son. 
In Logan v. Phillips, 891 S.W.2d 542, 544 (Missouri 1995) the Court 
declined to find respondeat superior where a police officer was involved in 
a fatal accident while traveling from his home to court in order to testify 
pursuant to a subpoena. He was in uniform at the time of the accident. 
In deciding against respondeat superior, the Court found that the 
officer was not reimbursed for any traveling expenses and his pay did not 
commence until he arrived at the courthouse. The Court further found that 
the City did not control the officer in the operation of the vehicle, his route 
or method of transportation. 
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These facts are so similar to the present case as to speak volumes 
against Plaintiffs' position. 
Plaintiffs' reliance on Workers' Compensation and foreign case law 
avail them little. To the extent that they are helpful, they demonstrate a 
record that supports the non-existence of the "employex-provided 
transportation" exception to the "coming and going" rule. The cases do, 
however, demonstrate a clear and consistent recognition by this Court of the 
"owner-required transportation" exception. 
Ms. Ross was not required to use the City's vehicle and in fact had to 
pay for the privilege. She was not performing any duties that benefited Salt 
Lake City. She was just driving home from work, a classic example of the 
"coming and going" rule. Respondeat superior liability is inappropriate 
under such circumstances. 
B. 
MS. ROSS WAS NOT ON A "SPECIAL ERRAND" 
Below, Plaintiffs argued, alternatively, that Ms. Ross was on a 
"special errand" and as such, came within an exception to the "coming and 
going" rule. The trial court, having concluded that Ms. Ross fell within the 
"owner-provided transportation" exception, declined to address the "special 
errand" exception. {See Memorandum Decision, fn. 1.) However, this 
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Court may rely on any basis having support in the record to affirm the trial 
court,16 so the City addresses such point herein. 
In support of their "special errand" argument, Plaintiffs submit the 
case of State Tax Commission v. Industrial Commission, 685 P.2d 1051 
1 7 
(Utah 1984)." In that case, the Court found that an employee who lived in 
Brigham City and drove to Salt Lake City to attend job-related training was 
on a special errand and, accordingly, covered by Workers' Compensation. 
Plaintiffs also rely upon another Workers' Compensation case, Drake 
v. Industrial Commission, 939 P.2d 177, 183 (Utah 1997) for a similar 
premise. 
Plaintiffs reliance on these cases belies the Court's actual holdings. 
In Drake, the Court clarified the significant factor it relied upon in its State 
Tax Commission holding. The Court stated: "[T]he employee in State Tax 
Commission was traveling to a one-time training seminar." Drake, 939 P.2d 
1 O 
at 184. Unlike the claimant in State Tax Commission, Ms. Ross's travel 
was to a regularly scheduled FTO meeting and while she was paid for her 
attendance at that meeting, she was not paid for her travel. See Fact Nos. 2, 
16
 First Security Bank of Utah v. Creech, 858 P.2d 958, 963 (Utah 1993). 
Curiously, the trial court used this "special errand" case to support its 
"owner-provided transportation" decision 
The claimant was also provided mileage reimbursement. State Tax 
Comm., 685 P.2d at 1055. Ms. Ross was not. See Facts 11 and 12, supra. 
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3, 6 and 7 supra. State Tax Commission is not only a Workers' 
Compensation case but factually incongruent with the negligence issues 
before this Court. 
Given the facts in Drake, supra, Plaintiffs' reliance thereon is even 
more curious. In that matter, claimant worked in Salt Lake City but lived in 
Ogden. Because the employer's regular courier service was not performing 
as expected, the employer asked claimant to pick up and deliver documents 
between Salt Lake and Ogden two or three days a week. Claimant was 
required to take a five-to-six-mile detour in order to accomplish this task. 
She was not compensated for her mileage nor was she given any overtime 
compensation when her deliveries required her to work more than her 
normal eight-hour work day. Drake, 939 P.2d at 179. 
Notwithstanding the Court's acknowledgement that Workers' 
Compensation cases resolve any doubts in favor of the claimant, the Court 
denied her "special errand" claim. Drake, 939 P.2d at 182, 184. The Court 
concluded that these deliveries were part of her normal duties. The Court 
held that a five to six mile diversion was insignificant. Finally, the Court 
correctly concluded that the risks to claimant were the very same risks to 
which any member of the traveling public was subject. Drake, 939 P.2d at 
184. The Court's attention is invited to the facts that Ms. Ross's travel was 
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on her way home; she was traveling from a regularly scheduled meeting; she 
could choose between using her personal vehicle or the City's vehicle; she 
paid to use the City's vehicle; she was transporting her infant child; and 
perhaps most importantly, was not, by her own admission, in furtherance of 
any police business. See Fact Nos. 4, 5, 11, 14, 15, 18 and 27. 
If the claimant in Drake, given her factual underpinnings and the 
Workers' Compensation presumption*favoring coverage, was unable to fall 
within the "special errand" exception, it is difficult to accept that Ms. Ross's 
meager facts coupled with Plaintiffs' higher burden of persuasion could 
meet the "special errand" requirements under a respondeat superior test. 
Similarly, in VanLeeuwen v. Industrial Commission, 901 P.2d 281, 
281 (Utah App. 1995) the Court held that an employee injured while en 
route to work in a truck provided by his employer was not on a "special 
errand" because "[the employee] was not being compensated for his time spent 
traveling between his home and [the employer's] office. The accident did not 
occur on [the employer's] premises, nor did [the employee's] duties require him to 
be at the place where the accident occurred. The risk that caused the accident was 
one common to the traveling public and was not created by duties connected with 
his employment." VanLeeuwen, 901 P.2d at 285. The Court concluded, as it 
did in Drake, that the risk that caused the accident was one common to all 
32 
the traveling public and was not created by duties connected with 
employment. VanLeeuwen, 901 P.2d 285.19 Such conclusions are wholly 
applicable to this matter. 
In Cross v. Industrial Commission, 824 P.2d 1202, 1205 (Utah App. 
1992) the Court summarily disposed of a claim similar to Plaintiffs' herein: 
At the time of [claimant's] accident, he was not on 
an errand for his employer, or even traveling at his 
employer's direction. [Claimant] was merely 
traveling home from work. [Claimant's] reliance 
on State Tax Commission is misguided. 
Finally, in Lundberg v. Cream O Weber, 465 P.2d 174 (Utah 1970) 
the Court found that although a company car was available to him, the 
Plaintiffs deceased husband chose to use his own car to attend an early 
morning meeting before normal work hours. In denying coverage, the Court 
found that attendance at a "specially called" meeting was not an unusual 
occurrence and did not make traveling to it a "special assignment or 
mission." Lundberg, 465 P.2d at 176. 
The Lundberg facts are remarkably similar to the instant matter and 
so, too, should be the result. Ms. Ross could choose between a company car 
and her personal vehicle. See Fact Nos. 11,13 and 14. She happened to 
choose a City vehicle which she paid for the right to use. See Fact No. 15. 
19
 These "special errand" factors are substantially similar to those of the 
Birkner test. See Point I, supra. 
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She was traveling from a regularly scheduled meeting. See Fact No. 5. She 
was not required to use a City vehicle to go to and from work. See Fact No. 
12. 
Nothing in Ms. Ross's facts distinguish this case from the foregoing 
cases that refused to find a "special errand." Workers' Compensation cases 
to the extent they are instructive at all in a negligence case, stand for the 
proposition that Ms. Ross was not on a "special errand" and, accordingly, 
not within the scope of her employment. 
III. 
THE TRIAL COURT APPLIED 
THE INCORRECT TESTS 
While acknowledging the existence of the Birkner test, the trial court 
summarily ignored its various prongs and, instead, fashioned a unique test 
drawing from so-called "owner-provided transportation" exception to the 
"coming and going" rule. 
The trial court based its decision on three findings: 
1. Ms. Ross was driving a City vehicle that she was permitted (but 
not required) to use; 
2. The City ordinance pertaining to take home vehicles; and 
20
 Such exception was mischaracterized and such mischaracterization led to 
the trial court's erroneous result. See Point II.A., supra. 
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3. The requirement that Ms. Ross maintain certain equipment in 
91 
the police vehicle and monitor the police radio while driving. 
None of these findings is sufficient to meet the Birkner test nor the 
exceptions to the "coming and going" rule. 
While it is undisputed that Ms. Ross was driving a City vehicle, that 
fact, contrary to the trial court's opinion, is not determinative. As more fully 
set forth in Point II. A., it is not the "providing" of the vehicle, rather the test 
is whether the employer "required' the employee to use the vehicle. The 
City did not require such use and the trial court's improper application of 
this essential element was error. 
Further, the trial court's reliance on the City's ordinance was 
improper. The ordinance in question provides: 
A. No motor vehicle owned by the City may be 
taken home by any City employee except under 
the following circumstances: 
1. Written permission is granted by the mayor of 
the mayor's designee on a demonstrated need 
for such vehicle to be taken home to serve the 
public interest. Such demonstrated need shall 
be deemed to exist for the following 
employees: 
21
 In fact the trial court's oversimplification of this issue is contrary to this 
Court's direction. See Drake 939 P.2d at 183 fn. 8. ("Although the control 
the employer exercises and the benefit the employer receives are factors, we 
do not think that either is necessarily decisive.") 
(b) employees who are subject to twenty-four-hour 
call. 
See Memorandum Decision p. 5. 
Initially, it is noted that the ordinance is permissive not mandatory, 
that is, the City did not require Ms. Ross to take her City vehicle home. In 
fact, it was her choice and she paid the City for the privilege. {See Fact Nos. 
11,13, 14 and 15.) 
In addition, the trial court presumably relied upon the ordinance 
phrase ". . . to serve the public interest. . ." as indicative of the benefit 
bestowed upon the City. However, such reliance was improper for two 
reasons. 
First, the trial court made no effort to discern the extent of that 
supposed benefit. In Martinson v. W-M Insurance Agency, 606 P.2d 256, 
258 (Utah 1980) this Court held: 
• • [I]f the predominant motivation and purpose of the 
activity is in serving the social aspect, or other 
personal diversion of the employee, even though 
there may be some transaction of business or 
performance of duty merely incidental or 
adjunctive thereto, the person should not be 
deemed to be in the course of his employment and 
where there is uncertainty as to the just-stated 
proposition, that should be resolved by the . . . trier 
of fact. 
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Here the trial court made no effort to distinguish the benefits between 
Ms. Ross and the City. While under most conditions that effort may be 
difficult, in this matter it is not. Salt Lake City received no benefit by Ms. 
Ross's commute in Tooele County. The public's interest referred to in the 
ordinance refers to the interests of Salt Lake City residents, not the public 
generally. Those residents derived no benefit from Ms. Ross's commute. 
On the other hand, the motivation for the commute were purely personal to 
Ms. Ross. 
This reasoning is wholly consistent with that espoused in Whitehead, 
801P.2dat937: 
The major premise of the "going and coming" rule 
is that it is unfair to impose unlimited liability on 
an employer for conduct of its employees over 
which it had no control and from which it derives 
no benefit. 
Liability follows benefits and when the trial court made no effort to 
determine the relative benefits, it failed to properly apply the policies and 
purposes behind the "coming and going" rule. 
In addition, the ordinance, given the specific facts herein, is wholly 
irrelevant. Salt Lake City's ordinances, including this one, are limited in 
scope and effect to the jurisdictional boundaries of Salt Lake City. Piatt v. 
Town ofTorrey, 949 P.2d 325, 336 (Utah 1997). The City did not, and 
in 
indeed could not, adopt an ordinance with the public policy finding that the 
City's program was intended to benefit the residents of Tooele County. The 
trial court's reliance upon this City ordinance, given the extra-territorial facts 
of this case, was a material error. 
The trial court also found relevance in the fact that Ms. Ross "was 
required to abide by specific requirements for operating her police vehicle, 
including having specified equipment in her vehicle and monitoring [sic] the 
radio while driving." (See Memorandum Decision, p. 5.) The trial court did 
not elucidate on the relevance of those findings but, instead merely refers to 
a New Mexico case, Medina v. Fuller, 971 P.2d 851 (N.M. 1998). 
The facts and law of Medina, however are so far afield from the 
present matter that its value amounts to zero. In Medina, the officer was 
required to take her police vehicle home. There is no evidence that she paid 
for the privilege of taking it home as did Ms. Ross. 
At the time of her accident, Officer Fuller, "was in her patrol unit, 
with her radio on, with badge and gun, and ready to respond to calls." 
Medina, 971 P.2d at 856. Ms. Ross, on the other hand had her one-year old 
son in the car and under Police Department policy, was not available to 
respond to a call. See Fact Nos. 18 and 20. 
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In Medina, the court found that the officer "must have his unit 
immediately available to him." Medina, 971 P.2d at 852. Ms. Ross did not 
have such need and the choice to use a City vehicle was totally hers for 
which she paid a fee. {See Fact Nos. 11, 13, 14 and 15.) 
In Medina, the court found, under department policy, that Officer 
Fuller, as a supervisor, was "on-call" at the time of the accident. The policy 
makes it clear that not all officers are always "on-call." Medina, 971 P.2d at 
852. Ms. Ross was not "on-call" and, in fact, the City has adopted a policy 
whereby an "off-duty" police officer can become an "on-duty" officer. If 
needed, an "off-duty" officer "shall notify the dispatcher" and when the 
officer does so, the officer will "be compensated pursuant to the overtime 
99 
policy consistent with the Fair Labor Standards Act." Ms. Ross had no 
reason to contact dispatch and go "on-duty" for the simple reason that she 
was performing no police function. 
Finally, New Mexico law provides that an employee is within the 
scope of employment, when, inter alia, the employee's conduct, "did not 
arise entirely from some external, independent and personal motive on the 
part of the employee. {Medina, 971 P.2d at 856.) Contrariwise, in Utah, the 
standard is very different. See Martinson, 606 P.2d at 258 ("if the 
22
 See excerpts form Take Home Car Program Policy D33-02—00.00 et seq. 
attached hereto as Addendum 2. 
predominant motivation and purpose of the activity is in serving the social 
aspect, or other personal diversion of the employee, even though there may 
be some transaction of business or performance of duty merely incidental or 
adjunctive thereto, the person should not be deemed to be in the course of 
employment.") Ms. Ross fits squarely within Martinson and, for that reason 
and the others set forth herein, reliance upon Medina was not only 
unnecessary, it was erroneous.23 
The trial court's efforts to fashion a test, to the exclusion of the 
existing and appropriate tests was error. 
23
 Medina, in any event appears an aberration among the states. See Evans v. 
Dixie Fasteners, 162 Ga.App. 74, 290 S.E.2d 172, 174 (1982) (Being on call 
24 hours a day does not necessarily mean employee was in the service of his 
employer when collision occurred); Herndon v. Neal, 424 S.2d 1180, 1182 
(La.Ct.App. 1982) (An informal "on call" situation does not mean the 
employee is within the course and scope of his employment every second of 
every day); Clickner v. City of Lowell, 422 Mass. 539, 663 N.E.2d 852, 855 
(1996) (The mere fact of being on call does not place employees within the 
scope of their employment); Ehlenfieldv. State, 62 A.D.2d 1151, 404 
N.Y.2d 649, 408 N.Y.S.2d 1023, 380 N.E.2d 336 (The fact that an employee 
is constantly "on call" is not sufficient to cast his employer in liability); 
Hantke v. Harris Mack Works, 152 Or. 564, 54 P.2d 293, 296 (1936) (The 
mere fact that an employee is on call does not render his employer liable); 
Melnickv.Neuman, 104 Wis.2d 744, 314N.W.2d 363 (App. 1981) (The fact 
that an employee is on call is merely one factor to be considered by the trier 
of fact in determining whether an employee is within or outside the scope of 
his employment. 
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CONCLUSION 
Two valid judicial tests exist to evaluate "scope of employment" 
issues - the Birkner test and the "coming and going" rule. The trial court 
acknowledged these tests but did not apply the facts of this case to either 
test. Preferring to fashion its own test, the trial court failed to go through the 
proper analysis and ended up with a draconian and erroneous result - a 
police officer is always on duty when in a police car. 
This result defies the facts in this specific case and creates an all-
encompassing rule of law contrary to the very dictates of this Court. The 
trial court's decision was incorrect and should be reversed. 
Respectfully submitted this ZH day of January, 2002. 
Chief Deputy City. Attorney 
Attorney for Appellant Salt Lake City 
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September 17, 2001 
The above-entitled matter comes before the Court pursuant to 
plaintiff's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment and defendants' 
Motion for Summary Judgment. The Court heard oral argument with 
respect to both motions on August 6, 2001. Following the hearing, 
the matters were taken under advisement. 
The Court having considered the motions, memoranda, exhibits 
attached thereto and for the good cause shown hereby enters the 
following ruling. 
The parties in this matter were involved in an auto accident 
which occurred in Tooele County. Defendant, Michelle Ross 
("Officer Ross") , is a Salt Lake City police officer and was 
driving her police vehicle home from a field training officer 
("FTO") meeting. Officer Ross' one year old son was in the car 
with her at the time. 
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The issue with respect to these motions is whether the City's 
liability is limited to what it owes as an insurer of the vehicle 
driven by Officer Ross or if the City is vicariously liable for all 
of plaintiffs' damages as Ross's employer. The issue turns on 
whether Officer Ross was acting within the course and scope of her 
employment at the time of the accident in question. Both parties 
agree it is a general rule that an employee is not acting within 
the course and scope of her employment when she is going or coming 
home from work. See Whitehead v. Variable Annuity Life Insurance 
Co., 801 P.2d 934 (Utah 1989). 
In support of their motion, plaintiffs note there are two 
exceptions to the general rule which apply here. First, plaintiffs 
argue Officer Ross was on a "special errand" and required to attend 
the FTO meeting. According to plaintiffs, it is well settled that 
where an employee is injured while traveling to or from a special 
mission, as distinguished from going to or coming home from his 
regular place of work, he is within the protection of the Worker's 
Compensation Act. Next, assert plaintiffs, Officer Ross was 
driving the employer owned vehicle for the benefit of her employer, 
the City. Indeed, argue plaintiffs, the City ordinance 
specifically finds the vehicle will be taken home to serve the 
public interest. 
Defendants oppose the motion and support their own motion for 
l i . < -
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summary judgment arguing the cases cited by plaintiffs in support 
of their motion are Worker's Compensation cases and in such 
situations, the presumption favors the injured employee. However, 
assert defendants, no such presumption attaches in negligence 
cases. Further, argue defendants, Officer Ross was not on a 
"special errand." Indeed, contend defendants, this was a regularly 
scheduled meeting and was not an unusual occurrence. Moreover, as 
for any benefit to the City, defendants argue Officer Ross was not 
pursuing any police business at the time of the accident, did not 
know how to contact the Tooele County emergency dispatch, was not 
required to use the City vehicle and was driving home with her 
infant child-which under the City's policy precluded her from 
taking any calls until the child was taken to safety. 
Finally, defendants cite to the case of Birkner v. Salt Lake 
County, 771 P.2d 1053, in which the Court set forth the following 
factors attendant to a finding of scope of employment: 
[I]n general the servant's conduct is within 
the scope of his employment if it is of the 
kind which he is employed to perform, occurs 
substantially within the authorized limits of 
time and space, and is actuated, at least in 
part, by a purpose to serve the master. 
Id. at 1056-57. 
In the instant case, assert defendants, none of these factors 
applies to Officer Ross at the time of the accident. 
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Summary judgment is appropriate only if no genuine issue of 
material fact exists and the moving party is entitled to judgment 
as a matter of law. See Utah R. Civ. P. 56(c). "In considering a 
summary judgment motion, the Court must evaluate all the evidence 
and all reasonable inferences fairly drawn from the evidence in the 
light most favorable to the party opposing summary judgment." 
Cinder v. A.L. Williams & Assocs., 739 P.2d 634, 634 (Utah Ct. App. 
1987) . 
As noted, in this case, there is no dispute regarding the 
general rule that an employee is not acting within the course and 
scope of her employment when she is going or coming home from work. 
See Whitehead v. Variable Annuity Life Insurance Co., 801 P.2d 934 
(Utah 1989) . Further, although the parties take issue with their 
applicability, neither side disputes the existence of the "owner 
provided transportation'' and "special errand'' exceptions to the 
general rule. 
Turning first to the owner provided transportation exception, 
in Whitehead, the Utah Supreme Court noted that the going and 
coming rule does not apply "where transportation was furnished by 
the employer to benefit the employer. . . " 685 P.2d at 1053. 
Applying this to the instant case, there is no dispute Officer Ross 
was driving a police vehicle and that she was permitted to drive 
such vehicle to and from work. Moreover, pursuant to Chapter 
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2.54.030 of the Salt Lake City Code, Ross' use of the City's 
vehicle was a benefit to the City. That ordinance specifically 
provides: 
A. No motor vehicle owned by the City may be 
taken home by any City employee except 
under the following circumstances: 
1. Written permission is granted by the 
mayor or the mayor's designee on a 
demonstrated need for such vehicle to be 
taken home to serve the public interest. 
Such demonstrated need shall be deemed to 
exist for the following employees: 
(b) employees who are subject to twenty-four-
hour call. 
The aforementioned, combined with the fact that Officer Ross 
was required to abide by specific requirements for operating her 
police vehicle, including having specified equipment in the vehicle 
and monitoring the radio while driving, makes clear Officer Ross 
was acting within the scope of her employment while driving home in 
her assigned police car. See Medina v. Fuller, 971 P.2d 851, 857 
(N.M. App. 1998) . Finally, because Officer Ross can be called to 
duty by the mere happening of events in her presence, she is 
essentially always on duty, at least when operating a police 
vehicle. 
Based upon the forgoing, the Court is persuaded the City is 
directly benefitted Officer Ross7 use of the City vehicle. 
Accordingly, the Court finds her travel was within the course and 
1. .i 
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scope of her employment. See Collier v. County of Nassau, 3 62 
N.Y.S.2d 52 (Sup. Ct. App. Div. 1974). Consequently, plaintiff's 
Motion for Partial Summary Judgment is granted and defendants' 
Motion for Summary Judgment, respectfully, denied.1 
DATED this //y day of September, 2001. 
G££NN K. IWASAKI l^V11?!^^"/ / 
DISTRICT COURT JUD0£^S,J^^ / 
xBased upon this finding, the Court does not reach the 
special errand exception. 
Ki-
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Addendum 2 
EXCERPTS FROM TAKE-HOME CAR POLICY 
7. When using the vehicle, off-duty employees must keep the 
police radio on an, if necessary, be available to respond to emergency calls. 
If in the vicinity, the officer should respond to in-progress crimes or other 
major calls. The officer shall notify the dispatcher of the response and 
should continue to assist until relieved or until the problem is concluded. 
Passengers should not be in police vehicles while responding to 
emergencies or dangerous calls. They should be left in a safe place prior to 
arrival at the scene. 
8. If an off-duty officer responds to a dispatched call or performs 
other police services as discussed in paragraph 6 [sic] above1, the officer will 
be compensated pursuant to the overtime policy consistent with the Fair 
Labor Standards Act. 
1
 In 1999, another section of the policy was modified but the numbering was not correlated. Paragraph 6 
deals with dress codes and the reference to paragraph 6 in paragraph 8 is clearly incorrect. In context, the 
reference to paragraph 6 in paragraph 8 clearly was meant to refer to paragraph 7. 
Addendum 3 
10-3-914 Police officers -Authority. 
(1) Within the boundaries of the municipality, police officers have the 
same authority as deputy sheriffs, including at all times the authority to 
preserve the public peace, prevent crime, detect and arrest offenders, 
suppress riots, protect persons and property, remove nuisances existing in 
the public streets, roads, and highways, enforce every law relating to the 
suppression of offenses, and perform all duties required of them by 
ordinance or resolution. 
(2) This section is not a limitation of a police officer's statewide authority as 
otherwise provided by law. 
53-13-103 Law enforcement officer. 
(1) (a) "Law enforcement officer" means a sworn and certified peace officer 
who is an employee of a law enforcement agency that is part of or 
administered by the state or any of its political subdivisions, and whose 
primary and principal duties consist of the prevention and detection of crime 
and the enforcement of criminal statutes or ordinances of this state or any of 
its political subdivisions. 
(b) "Law enforcement officer" specifically includes the following: 
(i) any sheriff or deputy sheriff, chief of police, police officer, or marshal of 
any county, city, or town; 
(ii) the commissioner of public safety and any member of the Department of 
Public Safety certified as a peace officer; 
(iii) all persons specified in Sections 23-20-1.5 and 63-11-17.2; 
(iv) any police officer employed by any college or university; 
(v) investigators for the Motor Vehicle Enforcement Division; 
(vi) special agents or investigators employed by the attorney general, district 
attorneys, and county attorneys; 
(vii) employees of the Department of Natural Resources designated as peace 
officers by law; 
(viii) school district police officers as designated by the board of education 
for the school district; 
(ix) the executive director of the Department of Corrections and any 
correctional enforcement or investigative officer designated by the executive 
director and approved by the commissioner of public safety and certified by 
the division; 
(x) correctional enforcement, investigative, or adult probation and parole 
officers employed by the Department of Corrections serving on or before 
July 1, 1993; 
(xi) members of a law enforcement agency established by a private college 
or university provided that the college or university has been certified by the 
commissioner of public safety according to rules of the Department of 
Public Safety; and 
(xii) airport police officers of any airport owned or operated by the state or 
any of its political subdivisions. 
(2) Law enforcement officers may serve criminal process and arrest violators 
of any law of this state and have the right to require aid in executing their 
lawful duties. 
(3) (a) A law enforcement officer has statewide full-spectrum peace 
officer authority, but the authority extends to other counties, cities, or 
towns only when the officer is acting under Title 77, Chapter 9, Uniform 
Act on Fresh Pursuit, unless the law enforcement officer is employed by 
the state. 
(b) (i) A local law enforcement agency may limit the jurisdiction in which its 
law enforcement officers may exercise their peace officer authority to a 
certain geographic area. 
(ii) Notwithstanding Subsection (3)(b)(i), a law enforcement officer may 
exercise his authority outside of the limited geographic area, pursuant to 
Title 77, Chapter 9, Uniform Act on Fresh Pursuit, if the officer is pursuing 
an offender for an offense that occurred within the limited geographic area. 
(c) The authority of law enforcement officers employed by the Department 
of Corrections is regulated by Title 64, Chapter 13, Department of 
Corrections —State Prison. 
(4) A law enforcement officer shall, prior to exercising peace officer 
authority, satisfactorily complete: 
(a) the basic course at a certified law enforcement officer training academy 
or pass a certification examination as provided in Section 53-6- 206, and be 
certified; and 
(b) annual certified training of at least 40 hours per year as directed by the 
director of the division, with the advice and consent of the council. 
77-9-3 Authority of peace officer of this state beyond normal jurisdiction. 
(1) Any peace officer authorized by any governmental entity of this state 
may exercise a peace officer's authority beyond the limits of such 
officer's normal jurisdiction as follows: 
(a) when in fresh pursuit of an offender for the purpose of arresting and 
holding that person in custody or returning the suspect to the 
jurisdiction where the offense was committed; 
(b) when a public offense is committed in such officer's presence; 
(c) when participating in an investigation of criminal activity which 
originated in the officer's normal jurisdiction in cooperation with the 
local authority; or 
(d) when called to assist peace officers of another jurisdiction. 
(2) (a) Any peace officer, prior to taking any action authorized by 
Subsection (1), shall notify and receive approval of the local law 
enforcement authority, or if the prior contact is not reasonably possible, 
notify the local law enforcement authority as soon as reasonably possible, 
(b) Unless specifically requested to aid a peace officer of another jurisdiction 
or otherwise as provided for by law, no legal responsibility for a peace 
officer's action outside his normal jurisdiction, except as provided in this 
section, shall attach to the local law enforcement authority. 
